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Abstract 
This paper examines the effects of new goods on the relative wages of skilled-labor and 
trade patterns in a two-cone Heckscher-Ohlin model and shows that: (i) new goods can be 
a valid theoretical explanation for the rising skill premium in the U.S. (ii) new goods 
have both domestic and international factor market effects, and their interplay determines 
the outcome and gives rise to surprising results; (iii) new goods that are “friendly” to the 
abundant (scarce) factors move the relative factor prices in the direction of convergence 
(divergence). The setup is general in the goods dimension so that the introduction of new 
goods is completely unrestricted, and the results apply to any one or any combination of 
the relative demand shocks for skilled labor. The results also apply when non-tradable 
goods are present. 
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Section 1. Introduction 
It is well-documented that the wages of  skilled workers relative to unskilled workers 
increased steadily in the U.S. in the late 1970s and 1980s (e.g. Bound and Johnson 1992, Katz 
and Murphy 1992). Meanwhile, many new products also emerged in this period (e.g. fiber optic 
cables, Windows series software, VCRs and soft contact lenses…).
2 Is there a causal link? This 
paper examines the effects of new goods on the relative wages of skilled labor (i.e. the skill 
premia) and the pattern of trade in a global economy with both developed (Home) and developing 
(Foreign) countries (i.e. with two diversification cones
3). The Home country is relatively 
abundant in skilled labor, and the Foreign country is relatively abundant in unskilled labor. 
New goods could be a valid theoretical explanation for the rising skill premium
4 if on 
average, they use skilled labor more intensively than old goods. This is because following the 
creation of the new goods, demand shifts away from the old goods towards them so that the 
production of the old goods contracts, releasing both skilled and unskilled labor. Since the new 
goods are more skilled-labor intensive on average, they demand a higher proportion of skilled 
labor compared with the factors released by the old sectors, creating excess relative demand for 
skilled labor and pushing up its relative wage. I call this effect the “domestic factor market 
effect”.  
Investigating the empirical validity of this explanation is interesting because new goods 
provide a direct measure of technology,
5 the leading explanation for rising skill premium in the 
                                                 
2 See Xiang (2002) for more examples. Even more anecdotes can be found in, for instance, Gray (1992), 
Zeisset and Wallace (1998), and various case studies by the now defunct Office of Technology Assessment.   
3 A diversification cone is a subset of the factor space. Countries that are identical except for their factor 
endowments achieve factor price equalization if their endowments are in the same cone.  
4 Wage inequality has two components: (1) skill premium, or the wage difference between workers with 
different skills and (2) residual wage inequality, or the wage difference between workers with similar skills 
(see Katz and Autor 1998).  
5 Technology has two effects on the relative demand for skilled labor: the direct effect is to create new 
goods, and the indirect effect is to change the production techniques of the old goods. The literature on 
technology and skill premia has focused on the indirect effect (e.g. Krueger 1993, Autor, Katz and Krueger 
1997), and been unable to find a satisfactory measure for it (e.g. DiNardo and Pischke 1997; see also 
Berman, Bound and Machin 1998). See Xiang (2002) for more details.  
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literature.
6 In Xiang (2002), I find that in the U.S. manufacturing sector, new goods are on 
average over 40% more skilled-labor intensive than old goods, and could account for about 30% 
of the increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Thus new goods appear to be a valid 
empirical explanation for the rising skill premium. 
However, in an open economy with two diversification cones, new goods also exert their 
influence through what I call the “international factor market effect”. To see how this effect 
works, suppose that before new goods appear, Home produces only radios, Foreign produces only 
shoes, and radios are more skilled-labor intensive than shoes. Now suppose that a new good, the 
computer, is created in Home and it is more skilled-labor intensive than both the radio and the 
shoes. Then the consumption shares of the radio and the shoes decline, and the aggregate 
consumption share of Foreign products, the shoes, falls relative to the aggregate consumption 
share of Home products, the radio and the computer. In other words, world demand shifts in favor 
of Home products. Because trade in goods can be thought of as trade in the factor services 
embedded in these goods, the demand for Home factor services increases so that Home factors 
become more expensive, other things equal. Then the radio becomes more expensive to produce 
in Home, and so its production switches to Foreign. Thus Home produces only computers. 
Because Home produces only radios before computers appear and computers are more skilled-
labor intensive than radios, the average skilled-labor intensity has increased for Home, pushing 
up the relative wage of skilled labor in this country.  
Therefore the first theme of this paper is the interplay between the domestic and international 
factor market effects. The domestic factor market effect is related to the change of the average 
factor-usage intensity, and new goods are said to be “friendly” to a factor in a country if they 
increase the average intensity of this factor’s usage in this country. In the previous example, the 
new goods, computers, are skilled-labor friendly in Home because they increase the average 
skilled-labor intensity in this country. On the other hand, the international factor market effect is 
                                                 
6 See Bound and Johnson (1992), Berman, Bound and Griliches (1994), Feenstra and Hanson (1999). 
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related to the change of the aggregate demand for one country’s products relative to the other 
country’s products, and new goods are said to be “friendly” to a country if they increase the 
relative demand for this country’s products. In the previous example, the computers are Home 
friendly because they shift world demand in favor of the Home country’s products. The factor-
friendliness and country-friendliness of the new goods are key parameters to the results.  
The interplay between the domestic and international factor market effects also gives rise to 
surprising results. Suppose new goods appear only in Home and they are unskilled-labor friendly. 
Would the Home country’s skill premium necessarily decline? The answer is “no” because of the 
international factor market effect. New goods are Home friendly and so they increase the relative 
demand for Home products and Home factor services. Then Home factors become more 
expensive and Home produces a narrower range of products so that its average skilled-labor 
intensity increases. Thus the relative wage of skilled labor could increase in Home, as shown in 
Section 5. Now suppose that new goods appear only in Home and they are skilled-labor friendly. 
Could Home expand its production into unskilled-labor intensive sectors? The answer is “yes” 
because of the domestic factor market effect. New goods are skilled-labor friendly and so they 
tend to increase the relative wage of skilled labor in Home. The other side of the coin is that 
unskilled labor becomes relatively cheap so that the marginal costs of the unskilled-labor 
intensive sectors decline. Thus Home could expand its production into these sectors, as shown in 
Section 5. 
The second theme of this paper is that the analytical framework is general in the goods 
dimension. First, there is no restriction on the new goods and the old goods regarding their 
numbers, consumption shares, productivity parameters, or factor usage intensities. There can be 
either a finite number or a continuum of goods. An individual new good can be more, or less, 
skilled-labor intensive than every old good, or have an intermediate skilled-labor intensity. The 
new goods could appear in both Home and Foreign. They might account for a tiny fraction of the 
aggregate consumption expenditure, or the bulk of it, and their average skilled-labor intensity can 
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be identical to or drastically different from the old goods, whose productivity parameters may 
vary across sectors. Second, the exogenous change of introducing new goods is modeled as a 
shock to the production set, the set of all the goods that are produced by the world economy. 
Because this shock could also result from changes in consumer tastes, production techniques, or 
productivity parameters of the old goods, the model treats all these relative demand shocks for 
skilled labor in a unified framework, and the results apply to any one, or to any combination of 
them, as shown in Section 4. The results also apply when non-tradable goods are present, as 
shown in Section 6. Finally, the results hold for large changes. This is useful for the related 
empirical work, because if new goods really matter for the rising skill premium, they would have 
to either capture a significant portion of the consumption expenditure, or employ a considerably 
higher skilled-unskilled mix. 
This general framework also allows us to think about the effects of new goods from the 
perspective of the lens condition for factor price equalization (FPE)
7. In an open economy with 
two diversification cones, FPE is not achieved because the difference between sector factor 
usages is too small compared with the difference in national factor endowments. If new goods are 
friendly to the abundant (scarce) factors in both countries, they tend to increase (decrease) the 
difference in sector factor usages and move the economy closer to (farther away from) achieving 
FPE; thus factor prices move in the direction of convergence (divergence).  
This paper adopts a Heckscher-Ohlin model under CES preferences with two diversification 
cones. A multi-cone model is not only suitable when both developed and developing countries are 
present (e.g. Deardorff 1998), but also consistent with a few empirical studies (e.g. Debaere and 
Demiroglu 1998; Schott 1997). In contrast, a small-open-economy model has factor prices pinned 
down by exogenous commodity prices, and so fails to fully consider the general equilibrium 
effects of new goods, and a Heckscher-Ohlin model with one diversification cone and FPE 
                                                 
7 See, for example, Deardorff (1994) and Xiang (2001).  
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behaves like a closed economy, and can be regarded as a special case of the two-cone model 
because the international factor market effect is absent.  
A number of studies examine the effects of factor-biased and/or sector-biased technological 
changes on relative wages, and all of them use a one-cone model with FPE or Hicks-neutral 
differences in technology.
8 Zhu (2001) is closest in spirit to this paper, but she mainly focuses on 
what happens to the relative wage of skilled labor in the developing country under Cobb-Douglas 
preferences when every new good appears in the developed country and is more skilled-labor 
intensive than every old good.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model and discusses the key 
properties of the equilibrium. Section 3 presents the main results and the intuition behind their 
proof, and then illustrates the intuition based on the lens condition for FPE. Section 4 discusses 
the applications of these results to various relative demand shocks for skilled labor. Section 5 
shows some surprising results graphically using a simple case, and Section 6 discusses the case of 
many countries with two diversification cones and the case of non-tradable goods. Finally, 
Section 7 concludes.  
 
Section 2. Setup and Equilibrium 
2.1. Setup  
Consider a Heckscher-Ohlin model with two diversification cones. The universe of goods that 
the world can produce is G, and the subset of goods that it actually produces is P. Let P ⊆  G ⊆  
Ñ. If  P  has a continuum of elements (e.g. P = [0,1]), the model becomes the continuum 
Heckscher-Ohlin model a la Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980). If P has a finite number 
                                                 
8 See, for example, Leamer (1996), Krugman (2000) and Xu (2001). This literature is relevant because 
technological changes, or process innovation, are sometimes difficult to distinguish from new goods, or 
product innovation (e.g. is a titanium bike process innovation or product innovation?). In this paper, new 
goods refer to well-defined final (consumer) products.  
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of elements (e.g. P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}), the model becomes the finite-good Heckscher-Ohlin 
model as used in Deardorff (1979).  
Index the goods in G by z. Production exhibits constant returns to scale and uses two factors, 
skilled labor and unskilled labor. The factor endowments are Ls and Lu; let s ≡  Ls/Lu. Factor prices 
are ws and wu, and let ω  ≡  wu/ws be the relative wage of unskilled labor. For a good z, its price is 
P(z), and its unit factor requirements are as(z) and au(z). Let s(z) ≡  as(z)/au(z) be the skilled-labor 
intensity of sector z. Assume that factor intensity reversal is absent. Then the goods can be ranked 
in an ascending order by their skilled-labor intensities (i.e. the goods with larger index numbers 
are more skilled-labor intensive). Also, let the factor income shares of sector z be θ s(z) and θ u(z). 
Notice that in general, s(z),θ s(z) and θ u(z) all depend on factor prices. 
On the demand side, the representative consumer has the following CES preferences: 
   U = [∫G  c(z)
1-γ x(z)
γ ]
1/γ ;  γ  ≡  (σ  – 1)/σ      
The elasticity of substitution is σ  (σ  ≥  1), and c(z)’s are parameters showing how much the 
consumer favors good z, whose quantity consumed is x(z) and whose share in consumption 
expenditure is: 
   b(z) = c(z)P(z)
1-σ /P; P ≡  ∫G  c(z)P(z)
1-σ dz  
Notice that the preferences are defined over G. Before new goods appear, their costs are infinite 
so that their prices are infinite and their consumption shares are 0. As technological progress 
decreases the costs of these new goods to some finite number, their prices drop, and they are 
consumed.
9 Also notice that ∀ z ∈  P, b(z) can either be infinitesimal
10 (e.g. P = [0,1]) or a 
positive number between 0 and 1 (e.g. P = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}), and they add up to 1 (i.e. ∫Pb(z)dz = 
1). Let b denote a distribution of b(z) across z.  
                                                 
9 Notice that (1) when σ  = 1, the preferences become Cobb-Douglas with b(z)’s as constants. Thus the 
preferences should be defined over P (otherwise new goods would have positive consumption shares even 
before they appear), and so the emergence of new goods necessarily involves a change in preferences; (2) 
“technological progress” is to be broadly interpreted: a clever idea (e.g. opening a fast food restaurant) is 
“technological progress”, and so is automation.  
10 That is, b(z)dz is the consumption share of goods in [z, z+dz].  
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There are two countries, Home and Foreign, identical except for factor endowments. Home is 
relatively abundant in skilled labor, and the superscript “*” denotes Foreign variables. Without 
loss of generality, assume Lu = Lu
*. Furthermore, all the goods markets are perfectly competitive 
and there is no barrier to international trade. Factors are perfectly mobile domestically, but 
immobile internationally.  
2.2. Equilibrium 
For a good z ∈  P, its price equals its marginal cost, MC(z):  
(1)   P(z) = MC(z) = wsAs(z); As(z) ≡  au(z)[ω  + s(z)]   ∀ z ∈  P     
Equation (1) decomposes MC(z) into two parts: the wage of skilled labor (ws) and the unit factor 
requirement for a fictional factor “equivalent skilled labor” (As(z))
11 that always has the same 
price as skilled labor. The importance of thinking about equivalent skilled labor will become clear 
soon. 
Second, Home and Foreign specialize and “carve up” the production set P. Let PH and PF 
denote the Home and Foreign production sets and let both be non-empty. As skilled labor is more 
abundant in Home, every good in PH is more skilled-labor intensive than every good in PF except 
for the common good, when it exists, that both countries produce; i.e., PH and PF may have at 
most one good in common. Let  g (X)  ( g (X)) be the most (least) skilled-labor intensive good in a 
set X.
 12 Then the pattern of trade and specialization can be summarized as: 
(2)   PH∪ PF = P, g (PF) ≤   g (PH)         
                                                 
11 To see why, skilled labor is converted into “equivalent skilled labor” one-for-one, but one unit of 
unskilled labor is converted into ω  units of equivalent skilled labor; thus a unit of good z uses as(z) + au(z)ω  
= au(z)[ω  + s(z)] = As(z) units of equivalent skilled labor.   
12 Assume that the closure of P is a subset of G and is compact. Then  g (PF) and  g (PH) always exist, 
although they might not be in the set P, in which case ∃  z ∈  PF (PH) arbitrarily close to  g (PF) ( g (PH)).  
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For (2) to be consistent with the marginal costs determined by the Home and Foreign factor 
prices, a Foreign good must be no cheaper to produce in Home and a Home good no cheaper to 
produce in Foreign. Let h(z) be the relative marginal cost (of Home production) for good z: 
(3)   h(z) ≥   0 ∀  z∈ PF,  h(z) ≤   0 ∀  z∈ PH; h(z) ≡  ln[MC(z) /MC
*(z)]    
Thirdly, when all domestic markets clear in Home:
13 
(4)   1/ω  = µ(ω ; PH, b)/s; µ(ω ; PH, b) ≡   θ ∫
H P z b ) ( s(z)dz/ θ ∫
H P z b ) ( u(z)dz  
The term µ(.)
14 is the ratio of the average income share of skilled labor to the average income 
share of unskilled labor, both weighted by sector shares in consumption. It can be thought of as 
the average skilled-labor intensity
15 across all sectors of the Home economy. Clearly, the average 
skilled-labor intensity is the relative demand for skilled labor. On the other hand, the relative 
supply of skilled labor is the ratio of skilled-labor endowment to unskilled-labor endowment (s). 
Thus by (4), the relative wage of skilled labor (1/ω ) is determined by its relative demand (µ(.)) 
and relative supply (s).  
Similarly for Foreign: 




*; PF, b) ≡   θ ∫
F P z b ) ( s
*(z)dz/ θ ∫
F P z b ) ( u
*(z)dz   
Finally, international payments must be balanced. Since international trade in goods can be 
viewed as the exchange of factor services, this balance-of-payments condition can be written as 
the equilibrium condition of an international factor market for the service of equivalent skilled 
labor (see Appendix 1 for the derivation of (6)): 













) ( ; Λ (PH,PF,b;ω ,ω









dz z A z c
dz z A z c
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13 See Appendix 1 for the derivation of (4). Notice that it holds under any preference specification 
consistent with the existence of a representative consumer and/or when there are more than two factors. 
14 At equilibrium, µ(.) depends on ω  only because: 1. θ s(z), θ u(z) depend on ω  only; 2. the prices of Home 
goods depend on ω  only by (1); 3. the price index P, in the definition of b, appears in both the numerator 
and the denominator of µ(.) and cancels out.  
15 The “intensity” here is based on factor shares, not unit factor requirements as in Section 2.1; these two 
measures yield the same ranking under the same factor prices, and will be used interchangeably henceforth. 
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The term Λ (.) is proportional to the relative demand for Foreign goods and can be interpreted 
as the relative demand for the service of Foreign equivalent skilled labor. Its relative supply is 
(ω
*+s
*)/(ω  + s) because for every unit of Foreign (Home) unskilled labor there are ω
*+s
* (ω +s) 
units of Foreign (Home) equivalent skilled labor.
16 Finally, the relative price of Foreign 
equivalent skilled labor is simply ws
*/ws. Therefore, other things equal, an increase in Λ (.) tends 
to increase ws
*/ws, and an increase in (ω
* + s
*)/(ω  + s) tends to decrease it.  
The equilibrium (2)~(6) is built on two important properties:  
Property 1 (downward-sloping relative demand curve): ωµ (ω ; PH, b) strictly increases in 
ω , and ω *µ(ω
*; PF, b) strictly increases in ω *.  
Property 2 (comparative advantage): h(z) decreases in z.  
Proof: See Appendix 2.  
Since the relative wages of skilled labor are 1/ω  and 1/ω
*, Property 1 says that the relative 
demand curves for skilled labor are strictly decreasing. This property ensures that the domestic 
factor market effect functions properly. Suppose new goods are skilled-labor friendly; then the 
relative demand for skilled labor increases. Property 1 guarantees that when this happens, the 
relative wage of skilled labor tends to increase.  On the other hand, Property 2 says that the 
relative marginal cost (of Home production) decreases (not necessarily strictly) with the goods 
index; i.e. Home has a comparative advantage in producing skilled-labor intensive goods. This 
property ensures that the international factor market effect functions properly. Suppose new 
goods are Home friendly; then the relative demand increases for Home factor services. As a 
result, Home factors become more expensive, and Home’s production set contracts. Property 2 
guarantees that when this happens, the production of the most unskilled-labor intensive Home 
goods switches to Foreign so that the average skilled-labor intensity increases in Home.  
                                                 
16 Recall that one unit of skilled (unskilled) labor is converted to one (ω ) unit(s) of equivalent skilled labor.  
  9  10
 
Section 3. Main Results  
3.1. Definitions and Propositions 
Model new goods as an exogenous shock to the production set that takes 3 steps to complete. 
First, a new production set P1 replaces the original one P0 and a new allocation of consumption 
shares b’ replaces the original allocation b.
17 Second, all the goods in P1 are ranked by their 
skilled-labor intensities at the original factor prices in an ascending order. Finally, factor prices 
change and the economy adjusts to a new equilibrium. Let the subscript “0” denote the variables 
at the original equilibrium, “1” those associated with the new production set and the new 
consumption-share allocation but the original factor prices, and “n” those at the new equilibrium. 
For example, the Home production set is PH,0 at the original equilibrium (P0, b and ω 0), becomes 
PH,1 under P1, b’ and ω 0, and changes to PH,n at the new equilibrium (P1, b’ and ω n). The factor-
friendliness and country-friendliness of the shock then determine the outcome.     
Definition 1. Factor Friendliness (Home): Let ψ H ≡  µ(ω 0;PH,1,b’) – µ(ω 0;PH,0,b); i.e. ψ H is 
the change in the Home average skilled-labor intensity at the pre-shock factor prices. Then a 
shock is friendly to skilled (unskilled) labor if ψ H > 0 (< 0), and factor-neutral if ψ H = 0.  
Definition 2. Factor Friendliness (Foreign): Let ψ F ≡  µ(ω 0
*;PF,1,b’) – µ(ω 0
*;PF,0,b); i.e. ψ F 
is the change in the Foreign average skilled-labor intensity at the pre-shock factor prices. Then a 
shock is friendly to skilled (unskilled) labor if ψ F > 0 (< 0), and factor-neutral if ψ F = 0.  
Definition 3. Country Friendliness: Let Γ  ≡   ( z ) d z /  (z)dz –  (z)dz/ (z)dz; 
i.e. Γ  is the change in the relative demand for Home goods (at the pre-shock factor prices). A shock is 




H P b ∫
1 ,
'
F P b ∫
0 , H P b ∫
0 , F P b
Definition 4. Neutral Shock: A neutral shock is factor-neutral in both countries and country-
neutral (i.e. ψ H = ψ F = Γ  = 0).  
                                                 
17 Notice that the preference parameters c(z)’s might change as part of the shock.  
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The main results are:  
Proposition 1. (ω ) The relative wage of skilled labor strictly rises (falls) in Home if the 
shock is friendly to Home (Foreign) or country-neutral and friendly also to the abundant (scarce) 
factors or factor-neutral in both countries; i.e., ω n < ω 0 (ω n > ω 0) if Γ  ≥  0 (≤  0), ψ H ≥  0 (≤  0), ψ F ≤  
0 (≥  0), and at least one inequality is strict. 
Proposition 2. (ω
*) The relative wage of skilled labor strictly rises (falls) in Foreign if the 
shock is friendly to Home (Foreign) or country-neutral and friendly also to the scarce (abundant) 
factors or factor-neutral in both countries; i.e., ω n
* < ω 0
* (ω n
* > ω 0
*) if Γ  ≥  0 (≤  0), ψ H ≤  0 (≥  0), 
ψ F ≥  0 (≤  0), and at least one inequality is strict. 
Proposition 3. (Production sets) The Foreign (Home) production set contracts if the shock is 
friendly to Foreign (Home) or country-neutral, and friendly also to skilled (unskilled) labor or 
factor-neutral in both countries; i.e., PF,n ⊆  PF,1 (PH,n ⊆  PH,1) if Γ  ≤  0 (≥  0), ψ H ≥  0 (≤  0), ψ F ≥  0 
(≤  0), and at least one inequality is strict
18.  
Proposition 4. (Neutral shock) A neutral shock has no effect on ω 0, ω 0
*, PH,1 and PF,1.  
Proof: See Appendix 3.  
Because moving from one equilibrium to another with identical exogenous variables is a 
neutral shock and ω , ω
*, PH and PF determine all the other endogenous variables, Proposition 4 
implies that:  
Corollary 1. (Uniqueness) The equilibrium is unique when it exists.  
Propositions 1~4 are general because they hold for large changes and apply to any one or any 
combination of the following relative demand shocks for skilled labor: new goods, preference 
                                                 
18 Notice that (1) PH contracts (expands) if and only if PF expands (contracts); (2) a contraction in PH (PF) 
might not involve a change in  g (PH) ( g (PF)) because when the common good exists and has a large 
consumption share, the contraction could show up as a change in Home’s (Foreign’s) share in the 
production of this common good; (3) The contraction is not strict because when g (PF) < g (PH) , the gap 
could be so large that Home is completely insulated from what happens in Foreign. 
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changes for the old goods, and changes in production techniques and sector-specific and country-
specific productivity parameters, as shown in Section 4. On the other hand, Propositions 1~4 also 
accommodate surprising results (some of which are mentioned in the Introduction), as shown in 
Section 5.  
3.2. Proof: Intuition 
Proving Propositions 1~4 is not trivial. First, a shock to the production set is difficult to 
parameterize because it can result from different relative demand shocks that require different 
parameterizations (e.g. a change in preferences versus a change in production techniques). 
Second, even if a parameterization is feasible, differentiation is difficult because the production 
sets might be discrete and there might not exist a common good that both countries produce. To 
get around these problems, I prove Propositions 1~4 by contradiction.  
Take Proposition 1 as an example, and consider a shock that is friendly to Home and friendly 
also to the abundant factors in both countries (i.e. ψ H > 0, ψ F < 0 and Γ  > 0). We want to show 
that the relative wage of skilled labor strictly increases in Home (i.e. ω n < ω 0). Suppose at the new 
equilibrium, this relative wage decreases (i.e. ω n ≥  ω 0). First, the relative demand for skilled labor 
is higher in Home at the pre-shock factor prices (i.e. ω 0) because the shock is skilled-labor 
friendly, and an increase in ω  raises this relative demand still further. The only way to absorb the 
excess relative demand is for Home to expand its production into unskilled-labor intensive 
sectors. Then the Foreign production set must contract, lowering the relative demand for skilled 
labor in this country, ceteris paribus; since the shock is unskilled-labor friendly in Foreign, the 
relative wage of skilled labor must decline in this country (i.e. ω n
* > ω 0
*). Thirdly, the relative 
demand for Foreign equivalent skilled labor (Λ (.)) decreases because the shock is Home friendly 
and on top of this, Home has expanded its production set. Now consider the good  g n ≡ g (PH,n), 
and let hn ≡  h( g n) denote its relative marginal cost (of Home production). As shown in Appendix 
3, the changes in ω , ω
* and Λ (.) imply that hn > 0 at the new equilibrium. In other words, the 
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hypothetical increase in ω  necessarily implies that it is cheaper to produce a Home good,  g n, in 
the Foreign country. This contradicts (3), and so ω  must strictly decrease.  
3.3. Illustration 
Figures 3.1 ~ 3.3 summarize the effects of Home-friendly, Foreign-friendly and country-
neutral shocks respectively. In each graph, ψ H is on the vertical axis and ψ F on the horizontal axis 
so that each point identifies the factor friendliness and country friendliness of the shock (e.g. a 
point in the 4
th quadrant of Figure 3.3 has ψ H < 0, ψ F > 0 and Γ  = 0). Thus Propositions 1~4 can 
be applied to the quadrants, axes and origin of each graph. First, the results in the quadrants are 
explicitly shown. For example, in the 2
nd quadrant of Figure 3.3, the shock is skilled-labor 
friendly in Home, unskilled-labor friendly in Foreign, and country-neutral, and so the relative 
wage of skilled labor increases in Home by Proposition 1 (i.e. ω  ↓ ) and decreases in Foreign by 
Proposition 2 (i.e. ω
* ↑ ). Second, the results on the axes and origins contain those of all the 
quadrants they border except for the origin of Figure 3.3. For instance, at the origin of Figure 3.2, 
both ω
* and ω  increase and PF contracts since the origin borders all the four quadrants so that 
Propositions 1~3 all apply. Thirdly, a small circle represents the origin of Figure 3.3, which 
corresponds to a neutral shock that has no effect, by Proposition 4. Finally, when the label of an 
endogenous variable does not appear in a quadrant, this variable may either increase or decrease 
as illustrated in Section 5.
19 For example, Section 5.1 shows that ω  could either rise or fall if the 
shock is unskilled-labor friendly in Home, factor-neutral in Foreign, and Home friendly. Thus the 
label of ω  does not appear in the 3
rd and 4
th quadrants of Figure 3.1.  
3.4. More Intuition: the Lens Condition for FPE 
                                                 
19 In other words, more information than the signs of ψ F, ψ H and Γ  is needed to determine how the variable 
changes. However, to gather such information, a simpler setup with more structure (e.g. Section 5) is more 
suitable.   
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The intuition based on the domestic and international factor market effects provides a 
“micro” view of the results: it helps the most when the results are examined case by case. A 
“macro” view of Propositions 1~2 can be obtained by thinking about the lens condition for FPE.   
Stated in the context of the integrated world economy (IWE),
20 a hypothetical world in which 
factors are perfectly mobile across national borders, the lens condition formalizes the intuition 
that to achieve FPE, the differences in factor endowments across countries have to be less, in 
some sense, than the differences in factor-usage intensities across goods. As the vectors of factor 
endowments form the “endowment lens” and those of sector factor usages at the IWE factor 
prices form the “goods lens”, the lens condition states that if FPE is achieved, then the 
endowment lens must lie inside the goods lens, and the converse is also true with 2 countries or 2 
factors.
21 Since countries specialize in this paper and FPE is not achieved, the lens condition fails; 
i.e. the difference in sector factor usages is not large enough. If this difference is increased 
(decreased) by the shock, the economy moves closer to (farther away from) achieving FPE, and it 
is intuitive for factor prices to converge (diverge) in some sense.
  
                                                
As Home is relatively abundant in skilled labor, its relative wage is lower in this country than 
in Foreign at the original equilibrium (i.e. ω 0 > ω 0
*). Thus an increase (decrease) in the relative 
wage of skilled labor in Home and/or a decrease (increase) in it in Foreign is a movement in the 
direction of convergence (divergence). On the other hand, a shock that is friendly to the abundant 
(scarce) factors in both countries increases (decreases) the difference in sector factor usages. 
Reorganizing Propositions 1 and 2:  
Corollary 2. Abundant-factor friendly shocks lead to convergence: If a shock is skilled-
labor friendly or factor-neutral in Home but unskilled-labor friendly or factor-neutral in Foreign, 
the relative wage of skilled labor strictly increases (decreases) in Home (Foreign) if the shock is 
 
20 See, for example, Dixit and Norman (1980).  
21 The converse might not be true with more than 2 factors. See Demiroglu and Yun (1999). 
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friendly to Home (Foreign) or country-neutral; i.e. ω n < ω 0 (ω n
* > ω 0
*) if ψ H ≥  0, ψ F ≤  0, Γ  ≥  0 (≤  
0), and at least one inequality is strict.   
Corollary 3. Scarce-factor friendly shocks lead to divergence: If a shock is unskilled-labor 
friendly or factor-neutral in Home but skilled-labor friendly or factor-neutral in Foreign, the 
relative wage of skilled labor strictly decreases (increases) in Home (Foreign) if the shock is 
friendly to Foreign (Home) or country-neutral; i.e. ω n >ω 0 (ω n
* <ω 0
*) if ψ H ≤  0, ψ F ≥  0, Γ  ≤  0 (≥  
0), and at least one inequality is strict. 
Figures 3.4 ~ 3.6 illustrate Corollaries 2 and 3 using new goods as an example
22. Figure 3.4 
shows the factor endowment box of an IWE producing 3 goods, 1~3, whose factor usage vectors 
are labeled as such. The goods lens is the polygon with these vectors as its sides. Since it is 
symmetric about the diagonal, Figure 3.4 shows only its upper half. Point E represents the 
distribution of factor endowments between Home and Foreign; since it is outside the goods lens, 
the lens condition does not hold, and FPE is not achieved.  
Look at Corollary 2 first. As the Home new goods are skilled-labor friendly, they congregate 
at the lower corner of the goods lens. They tend to use skilled labor more intensively, and so tend 
to make the lower portion of the goods lens bigger. Similarly, the Foreign new goods are 
unskilled-labor friendly and so they congregate at the upper corner of the goods lens and tend to 
make its upper portion bigger. When both conditions hold, the goods lens becomes bigger, in 
some sense, and the IWE is pushed in the direction of FPE. Then it is intuitive for factor prices to 
move in the direction of convergence. In Figure 3.5, a Home new good appears in the economy 
described by Figure 3.4, its skilled-labor intensity is higher than good 3, and its factor usage 
vector is labeled “n”. The average skilled-labor intensity of the IWE increases and ω IWE decreases 
(notice that the slopes of the factor usage vectors of the old goods, 1~3, are flatter), and the new 
                                                 
22 Notice that this intuition is loose. The lens condition has not been defined for a continuum of goods, and 
Corollaries 2 and 3 do not say how ω /ω
* will change unless the shock is country-neutral (Γ  = 0). In that 
case, ω↓  and ω
*↑  if the shock is friendly to the abundant factors in both countries (by Corollary 2), and ω↑  
and ω
*↓  if the shock is friendly to the scarce factors (by Corollary 3).  
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goods lens has the old one inside it, and gets “closer” to covering point E. Convergence occurs in 
that the relative wage of skilled-labor increases in Home (i.e. ω  falls).  
Similarly, in the case of Corollary 3, the new goods congregate in the middle portion of the 
goods lens, and tend to make the lens smaller. As the IWE is pushed away from achieving FPE, it 
is intuitive for factor prices to move in the direction of divergence. In Figure 3.6, a Foreign new 
good, n, appears in the economy of Figure 3.4, and its skilled-labor intensity is lower than good 2 
but higher than good 1. At unchanged IWE factor prices the new goods lens lies inside the old 
one and gets “farther away” from covering point E. Divergence occurs in that the relative wage of 
skilled labor decreases in Home (i.e. ω  rises). 
 
Section 4. Applications 
Since there is no restriction on the relation between P0 and P1 or between b and  b’ in 
Propositions 1~4, these propositions are powerful results applicable to different relative demand 
shocks for skilled labor, each of which corresponds to a restriction on P1, P0, b’ and b. First, let 
the sets of new goods and old goods be N and O, and N∩  O = ∅ . Propositions 1~4 can then be 
applied to new goods by having P0 = O0, P1 = O1∪  N, and O1 ⊆  O 0.
23 Second, the shift of 
consumer tastes among the old goods (a pure taste change) corresponds to P1 = O1 ⊆  P0 = O0. 
Finally, because a change in the production techniques
24 of an old good z can be thought of as the 
creation of a new good with the new production techniques and consumption share b(z) plus the 
demise of good z, it is a special case of new goods with the additional requirements that ∀ z0∈ P0, 
∃ z1∈ P1 such that b’(z1) = b(z0), and z1 ≠  z1’ if z0 ≠  z0’.  
Propositions 1~4 also apply to changes in Hicks-neutral productivity parameters. First, let 
A(z) ≥  1 be the productivity parameter of sector z so that an increase in A(z) reflects an increase in 
                                                 
23 The distinction between O0 and O1 is necessary because following the arrival of the new goods some old 
goods may cease to be consumed.  
24 This refers to an exogenous change in θ s and θ u with no change in productivity (thus the word 
“techniques” rather than “technologies”).  
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the productivity of sector z. Let b0(z) denote the consumption share of good z when A(z) = 1 ∀ z. 
Then (see Appendix 4 for their derivations):  
µ(ω ; X, b) = [∫Xb0(z)A
σ -1(z)θ s(z)dz][∫Xb0(z)A
σ -1(z)θ u(z)dz]
-1; X = PH, PF,  
Λ (.) = (ws
*/ws)
1-σ [∫
F P b 0(z)A
σ -1(z)dz][∫
H P b 0(z)A
σ -1(z)dz]
-1       
Thus when σ  = 1, the change in the A(z)’s has no effect, and when σ  > 1, it has the same effect as 
a pure taste change. Next, let AH ≥  1 be the Home-specific productivity parameter and suppose AH 
increases; i.e. the productivity of both factors increases by the same proportion in every sector in 
Home. Then µ(., PH) and µ(., PF) are unchanged and the prices of Home goods tend to fall; i.e. 
the increase in AH has no domestic factor market effect, and its international factor market effect 
is to expand the Home production set. Therefore the increase in AH can be modeled as a Foreign-
friendly shock that is factor-neutral in both countries (this is shown rigorously in Appendix 4).  
Furthermore, Propositions 1~4 apply to any combination of the above-mentioned shocks, and 
these shocks can be large changes. In other words, there can be any number of new goods with 
any allocation of consumption shares, and the new goods can have their own sector-specific 
productivity parameters, their arrival accompanied by changes in taste and production techniques 
of the old goods in a completely unrestricted way.  
The case of new goods merits more discussion because their creation might change the 
preferences of the old goods (i.e. c(z)’s might change for the old goods) so that the consumption 
shares of some old goods might decline by (proportionately) more than the others. I call the 
preference changes of old goods caused by the creation of new goods “induced preference 
changes”. For example, following the creation of personal computers, the (proportional) decline 
in the typewriter’s consumption share is likely to exceed the (proportional) decline in the 
consumption share of, say, the beef. This is not a problem for theory because of the generality of 
Propositions 1~4, but could be a problem for the empirical work that tries to identify the effects 
of new goods because in the real world, new goods and pure taste changes might occur side by 
side, and the induced preference changes are hard to distinguish from the pure taste changes. 
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Intuitively, the induced preference changes will not affect the outcome if the 
“complementarities” between the old goods and the new goods are “evenly” distributed among 
the old goods; then the above-mentioned problem is solved. To formalize this intuition, suppose 
new goods are the only exogenous change; then at pre-shock factor prices, the aggregate 
consumption share of the old goods declines from 1 to ρ  ≡  1 –∫N b’(z)dz ∈  (0,1). Let ε (z) ≡  b’(z) - 
ρ b(z); then for an old good z, ε (z) is the deviation of its consumption share from the benchmark 
ρ b(z) and represents its complementarity with the new goods. In other words, the old good, z, is a 
“complement” (“substitute”) of the new goods if ε (z) > 0 (< 0) so that its consumption share falls 
by less (more) than the average (of all the old goods). Then for ε (z)’s to be “evenly” distributed 
among the old goods: 
(7.1)   ∫Xε (z)θ s(z)dz = 0 and ∫Xε (z)θ u(z)dz = 0; X = OH,1,OF,1     
(7.2)   ∫Xε (z)dz= 0, X = OF,1, OH,1        
In other words, the complementarities between the old goods and the new goods are uncorrelated 
with the factor income shares of the old goods ((7.1)) and unrelated to where the old goods are 
produced ((7.2)). Thus the induced preference changes can be neutralized by imposing 
(7.1)~(7.2)
25. 
Under (7.1) and (7.2), we can also highlight the role of new goods by having the following 
alternative definitions of their factor-friendliness and country-friendliness:  
(8.1)  ψ H
n≡  µ(ω 0; NH, b’) - µ(ω 0; OH,0, b); ψ F
n ≡  µ(ω 0
*; NF, b’) - µ(ω 0
*; OF,0, b) 
(8.2)  Γ
n ≡   (z)dz/ (z)dz -  (z)dz/ (z)dz      ∫
H N b' ∫




0 , F O b
                                                 
25 When the induced preference changes are absent (i.e. σ  > 1 and c(z)’s do not change), (7.1) ~ (7.2) also 
hold because b’(z)/b(z) = P/P’ (P = ∫Oc(z)P(z)
1-σ dz; P’ = ∫N∪ Oc(z)P(z)
1-σ dz) so that ρ  = P/P’ and ε (z) = 0 
∀ z. Thus imposing (7.1) and (7.2) amounts to saying that either the induced preference changes are absent 
or they are present but do not affect the outcome.  




n have the same signs as ψ F, ψ H and Γ  in Definitions 1~4.
26 In other words, 
new goods are skilled-labor friendly in Home (Foreign) (ψ H > 0 or ψ F > 0) if and only if their 
average skilled-labor intensity exceeds the old goods (ψ H
n > 0 or ψ F
n > 0), and new goods are 
friendly to Home (Foreign) (Γ  > 0 or Γ  < 0) if and only if in this country, their consumption 
share is higher relative to the old goods and so, in some sense, more of them have appeared (Γ
n > 
0 or Γ
n < 0).  
Finally, in a closed economy or an open economy with one diversification cone and FPE, the 
international factor market effect is absent and the outcome depends solely on the domestic factor 
market effect. Apply Proposition 1 with ψ F = Γ  = 0: 
Corollary 4. The relative wage of skilled labor strictly increases (decreases) if and only if the 
shock is skilled (unskilled)-labor friendly.  
 
Section 5. Surprising Results  
To illustrate some of the surprising results contained in Propositions 1~4, consider the simple 
case in which there is a continuum of goods and the preferences are Cobb-Douglas (i.e.P = [0,1] 
and σ  = 1). Then there exists a common good, g, that both countries produce. To accommodate 
new goods, dig holes in the continuum [0, 1]; as new goods appear, these holes are filled up. The 
Home new good is zn, and it fills the hole [zn, zn+dzn], and in this example there is no Foreign 
new good.
27 Finally, assume that all the goods have identical consumption shares (i.e. b(z) = b(z’) 
∀  z, z’), and the consumption shares of the old goods all decrease by the same proportion (i.e. 
b’(z) = ρ  b(z) ∀  z; 0 < ρ  < 1) following the creation of zn.  
5.1. The Effect on the (Home) Relative Wage of Skilled Labor 
                                                 
26 See Appendix 4 for the rigorous proof. To see the distinction between ψ H
n, ψ F
n, Γ
n and ψ F, ψ H, Γ , notice 
that, for example, ψ H = µ(ω 0; NH∪ OH,1, b’) - µ(ω 0; OH,0, b) in the case of new goods. 
27 The effects of Foreign new goods have a similar intuition to Home new goods. See Appendix 5 for the 
treatment of Foreign new goods in this setup.  
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In this example, the relative wage of skilled labor could increase even if the new good is 
unskilled-labor friendly, according to Proposition 1. As shown in Appendix 5:  
(9.1)   sgn(d(ws/wu)) = −  sgn(dω ) = sgn(bψ  + c1bΓ );  
c1 > 0,  
                                                
bΓ  = dzn/(1-g ), bψ  = [θ s(zn)/∫g
1θ s(z)dz - θ u(zn)/∫g
1θ u(z)dz]dzn   
In other words, the change in the relative wage of skilled labor is determined by two terms, bψ  
and c1bΓ . First, bψ  is the marginal increase in the Home average skilled-labor intensity following 
the creation of the new good, zn, and so bψ  > 0 (< 0) if zn is friendly to skilled (unskilled) labor. 
Thus bψ  measures the domestic factor market effect. Notice that bψ  > 0 (< 0) if and only if s(zn) > 
s (< s)
28, and that bψ  increases with s(zn); i.e. the magnitude of the domestic factor market effect is 
larger the more zn’s skilled-labor intensity differs from the Home average. On the other hand, bΓ  
measures the marginal increase in the relative demand for Home equivalent skilled labor 
following the introduction of zn, and so bΓ  > 0 as zn is Home friendly in this example. Thus c1bΓ  
measures the international factor market effect. Notice that c1bΓ  does not depend on s(zn); i.e. the 
magnitude of the international factor market effect does not depend on the skilled-labor intensity 
of the new good, zn. 
Figure 5.1 graphs the two components of d(ws/wu), bψ  and c1bΓ , against the skilled-labor 
intensity of the new good, s(zn). The first component, bψ , shows up as the dashed upward-sloping 
line DD that intersects the horizontal axis at s(zn) = s, and this line represents the domestic factor 
market effect. The other component, c1bΓ , shows up as the dashed horizontal line II above the 
horizontal axis, and this line represents the international factor market effect. To obtain the total 
effect, add up the domestic and international factor market effects by shifting DD up to the solid 
line TT by the distance between II and the horizontal axis in Figure 5.1. If TT is above (below) 
the horizontal axis, the creation of zn leads to an increase (decrease) in ws/wu.  
 
28 s(zn) > (<) s  ⇔  s(zn)/ω  > (<) s/ω  = µ(ω ,g) ⇔  θ s(zn)/θ u(zn) > (<) µ(ω ,g) ⇔  bψ  > (<) 0.  
  20  21
Suppose zn is slightly unskilled-labor friendly (i.e. s(zn) is slightly to the left of s on the 
horizontal axis). Then its domestic factor market effect is but slightly different from 0 (the DD 
line is slightly below the horizontal axis), but its international factor market effect is sizeable (the 
II line is considerably above the horizontal axis) because this effect does not depend on zn’s 
skilled-labor intensity. Thus the international factor market effect dominates and d(ws/wu) > 0 (the 
TT line is above the horizontal axis). In other words, the relative wage of skilled labor has 
increased in Home even though ceteris paribus, the new good reduces the relative demand for 
skilled labor. To drive home the point that this surprising result is due to the international factor 
market effect, consider a closed economy producing the goods [g, 1]. The international factor 
market effect is then shut off, and in Figure 5.1, the sign of d(ws/wu) is determined by the DD line 
alone. Clearly, the relative wage of skilled labor rises (falls) if and only if zn is friendly to skilled 
(unskilled) labor.  
Finally, notice that when zn is skilled-labor friendly (s(zn) is to the right of s on the horizontal 
axis), the relative wage of skilled labor increases because both the domestic and international 
factor market effects work in the same direction (both the II and DD lines are above the 
horizontal axis). Also notice that the international factor market effect depends on not only bΓ  but 
also other coefficients of the model (these coefficients are grouped into c1). For example, let a21 
denote the marginal increase of the average skilled-labor intensity in Home following a marginal 
increase of the common-good index, g. An increase in the value of a21 implies a larger c1 and so a 
stronger international factor market effect. In Figure 5.2, this increase shows up as an upward 
shift of the TT line to T’T’. In other words, when the new good is unskilled-labor friendly, the 
relative wage of skilled labor is more likely to increase the larger is the value of a21.  
5.2 The Effect on the Pattern of Trade 
Another surprising result in this example is that Home could expand its production into 
unskilled-labor intensive sectors (i.e. the index of the common good, g, decreases) even if the 
new good is skilled-labor friendly, according to Proposition 3. As shown in Appendix 5:   
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(9.2)   sgn(dg) = sgn(bΓ  + a12bψ /a22)  
a12 = 1/(ω +s) – 1/(ω +s(g)) < 0, a22 = ∂ [ln(ωµ (.))]/∂ω  > 0     
As in Section 5.1, bΓ  measures the international factor market effect, and bΓ  > 0 because the new 
good, zn, is Home friendly. Figures 5.3 and 5.4 graph the logs of Home and Foreign marginal 
costs against the goods index. The (solid) Home marginal cost line HH is flatter than the (solid) 
Foreign marginal cost line FF
29 due to Property 2. The intersection of HH and FF determines the 
common-good index, g, and Home (Foreign) produces the goods to the right (left) of g for which 
HH lies below (above) FF. Because the creation of zn makes Home factors more expensive and so 
increases the Home marginal costs of all the goods, the international factor market effect shows 
up in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 as an upward shift of HH to the dashed line II. The intersection of II and 
FF is to the right of g, showing that the international factor market effect tends to contract 
Home’s production set.  
On the other hand, the domestic factor market effect is a12bψ /a22. Suppose zn is skilled-labor 
friendly (bψ  > 0); then the relative wage of skilled labor tends to increase (by bψ /a22). The other 
side of the coin is that unskilled labor becomes relatively cheap, and so the Home marginal cost 
of good g, which has a lower-than-average skilled-labor intensity (s(g) < s), declines (by 
|a12bψ /a22|). However, for a good z with a higher-than-average skilled-labor intensity (s(z) > s), 
exactly the opposite happens: its Home marginal cost goes up (by |a12(z)bψ /a22|; a12(z) =  1/(ω +s) 
– 1/(ω +s(z)) > 0). In other words, the skilled-labor friendly new good, zn, reduces (increases) the 
Home marginal costs of unskilled (skilled)-labor intensive goods through the domestic factor 
market effect. Therefore this effect shows up in Figure 5.3 as a counter clockwise tilting of HH to 
the dashed line DD at z0 such that s(z0) = s. Notice that the intersection of DD and FF (not 
explicitly shown) is to the left of g, showing that the domestic factor market effect tends to 
expand Home’s production set.  
                                                 
29For illustration, both HH and FF are drawn as linear and upward sloping.  
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 To obtain the total effect, add up the domestic and international factor market effects by 
shifting DD up by the distance between II and HH in Figure 5.3 to get the thick solid line TT. If 
TT intersects FF to the right (left) of g, the creation of zn leads to a contraction (expansion) of 
Home’s production set. If zn is very skilled-labor friendly, the domestic factor market effect is 
strong and so HH tilts a lot, as in Figure 5.3. Then TT intersects FF to the left of g. In other 
words, even though the new good appears in Home and is more skilled-labor intensive than 
average, Home could expand its production into unskilled-labor intensive sectors, and the more 
skilled-labor intensive is the new good, the more is this scenario likely to happen. To drive home 
the point that this surprising result is due to the domestic factor market effect, consider a 
continuum Ricardian model (a la Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1977)) with only one factor 
of production, skilled labor. Then the domestic factor market effect is shut off, and in Figure 5.3, 
the sign of dg is determined by the II line alone. Clearly, Home’s production set contracts because 
the new good, zn, is Home friendly (see Appendix 6 for the rigorous proof). 
Notice that when zn is unskilled-labor friendly (bψ  < 0), the HH line tilts clockwise as in 
Figure 5.4 so that the TT line intersects FF to the right of g: Home’s production set has contracted 
because the international and domestic factor market effects work in the same direction. Notice 
also that the domestic factor market effect depends on the coefficient a 22, which is negatively 
related to the slope of the relative demand curve for Home skilled labor. A decrease in the value 
of a22 makes this relative demand curve steeper so that a larger change in the relative wage of 
skilled labor is needed to restore equilibrium in the Home factor markets following an exogenous 
shock; i.e. the domestic factor market effect is stronger. This is illustrated in Figure 5.5, where the 
flatter T1T1 (steeper T0T0) line corresponds to a high (low) value of a22 and the new good, zn, is 
skilled-labor friendly (bψ  > 0). The T1T1 (T0T0) line intersects FF to the right (left) of g, showing 
  23  24
that Home’s production set contracts (expands)
30. In other words, when the new good is skilled-
labor friendly, Home’s production set is more likely to expand the steeper is the relative demand 
curve for Home skilled labor (i.e. the lower is a22).  
 
Section 6. More Applications 
First, Propositions 1~4 readily apply to many countries with two diversification cones 
because countries in the same cone have identical factor prices and marginal costs and can be 
aggregated into a single country bloc.  
Second, to apply Propositions 1~4 when non-tradable goods are present, one more 
assumption is needed. Let the superscript “T” denote sets of tradable goods:  
(10)   s(ω ; g (PH
T)) ≤  µ(ω ; PH, b); s(ω
*; g (PF
T)) ≥  µ(ω
*; PF, b)     
In other words, the least (most) skilled-labor intensive Home (Foreign) tradable good is less 
(more) skilled-labor intensive than the national average (including both tradable and non-tradable 
goods). To see why (10) is necessary, suppose Home new goods are unskilled-labor friendly and 
all non-tradable, and s(ω ; g (PH
T)) > µ(ω ; PH, b). Then the relative wage of skilled labor tends to 
decrease in Home and the (Home) marginal cost of the good  g (PH
T) tends to decrease because 
this good has a higher-than-average skilled-labor intensity. Since  g (PH
T) is also the least skilled-
labor intensive tradable good in Home, this country’s production set tends to expand. In other 
words, the domestic factor market effect on PH is exactly opposite to Sections 2~5, in which non-
tradable goods are absent (see, in particular, Section 5.2). However, once (10) is imposed, such 
problems do not arise, and so Propositions 1~4 apply with one minor modification: the country-
friendliness of the shock is determined by the tradable goods alone.  
                                                 
30 Appendix 6 shows two concrete examples, in both of which zn = 1: (1) the production technology is 
Leontief (i.e. ∀ z, the elasticity of substitution in production, η (z), is 0) with au(z) being a step function with 
3 discrete values, and g decreases; (2) the production technology has η (z) ≥  1 ∀ z, and g increases. The first 
(second) example corresponds to a low (high) value of a22.  
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Thirdly, factor-biased technological changes can also be analyzed, although doing so in a 
general way is beyond the scope of this paper. For example, for a closed economy (or an open 
economy with FPE) producing goods 1 and 2 with σ  > 1, let As,2 ≥  1 be the productivity parameter 
of skilled labor in sector 2, and η (.) the elasticity of substitution in production. Then an increase 
in As,2 can be treated as a decrease in ws for sector 2 by the same proportion and: (1) the income 
share of skilled labor in sector 2 (θ s(2))  increases (decreases) if η (2) > 1 (< 1) and does not 
change if η (2) = 1; (2) the marginal cost of sector 2 decreases, and so the price of good 2 drops 
and its consumption share (b(2)) increases since σ  > 1.
31 Because sector 1 is unaffected by the 
increase in As,2, how µ(.) changes depends on sector 2’s elasticity of substitution (η (2)): if η (2) ≥  
1, µ(.) increases so that ω  decreases; but if η (2)< 1, the changes of µ(.) (and so ω ) are ambiguous. 
Therefore, an increase in skilled labor’s productivity might not be skilled-labor friendly. 
Finally, the intuition based on the domestic and international factor market effects also works 
when other exogenous variables change. For example, suppose Ls increases (i.e. s increases). The 
domestic factor market effect tends to increase ω  because the relative supply of skilled labor has 
increased. This effect also increases the Home marginal costs of unskilled-labor intensive goods 
and so tends to contract Home’s production set. On the other hand, the international factor market 
effect tends to expand Home’s production set because the relative supply of Home’s equivalent 
skilled labor has increased and so Home factors have become cheaper. This effect also decreases 
the average skilled-labor intensity in Home, and so tends to increase ω . Thus ω  increases but 
Home’s production set could either expand or contract.  
 
Section 7. Conclusion and Discussion 
This paper analyzes the effects of new goods on factor prices and the pattern of trade in a 
Heckscher-Ohlin setup with CES preferences and two diversification cones, and both the setup 
                                                 
31 The former corresponds to the “direct impact effect” and the latter corresponds to the “indirect price 
effect” in the literature (see, for example, Xu 2001).  
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and the results are general in the goods dimension. New goods (as well as other exogenous 
changes of the relative demand for skilled labor) are modeled as a shock to the production set so 
that new goods could appear in a completely unrestricted way and the results apply to any one or 
any combination of the relative demand shocks for skilled labor. The results also apply when non-
tradable goods are present. Finally, the results are proved by contradiction and they hold for large 
changes.  
In this setup, new goods exert their influence through the domestic and international factor 
market effects. The former (latter) depends on the factor (country) friendliness of the new goods, 
and works by changing the relative demand for skilled labor (factor services) in the domestic 
(international) factor markets. The interplay between these two effects gives rise to surprising 
results. For example, Home new goods that are unskilled-labor friendly could increase the 
relative wage of skilled labor in this country due to the international factor market effect, and 
Home new goods that are skilled-labor friendly could expand this country’s production into 
unskilled-labor intensive sectors due to the domestic factor market effect. However, skilled-labor 
friendly new goods tend to increase the relative wage of skilled labor via the domestic factor 
market effect, and so new goods are a valid theoretical explanation for the rising skill premium in 
the U.S. 
While the domestic and international factor market effects provide a “micro” intuition for the 
results, the lens condition for FPE provides a “macro” one. A shock that is friendly to the 
abundant (scarce) factors in both countries tends to increase (decrease) the difference in sector 
factor usages and make the goods lens bigger (smaller); thus it pushes the IWE in the direction of 
(away from) FPE and moves the factor prices in the direction of converge (divergence) in the 
sense that the relative wage of skilled labor either rises (falls) in Home, or falls (rises) in Foreign, 
or both, depending on the country friendliness of the shock.  
Finally, the theoretical framework can be implemented empirically. In particular, (1) the 
finding that the relative demand for skilled labor is the average skilled-labor intensity holds in a 
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multi-good and multi-factor setting, and is robust to the specifications of preferences and 
production technologies; (2) the results are robust to different relative demand shocks for skilled 
labor and hold for large changes; (3) the average skilled-labor intensity is straightforward to 
compute. Therefore, once we have identified the new goods, we can implement the theoretical 
framework to measure their contribution to the rising skill premium in the U.S., as in Xiang 
(2002).  
Appendix 1: The Derivations of (4) and (6) 
 
A1.1 The derivation of (4) with two factors 
Proof: Let A be a set of goods that are produced in Home, y the income of all the consumers who are 
buying from this country, Q(z) the output of good z, and ls(z), lu(z) the demand for skilled and unskilled 
labor by sector z. Since b(z)  ≡  P(z)Q(z)/y,  θ x(z)  ≡  [lx(z)wx][P(z)Q(z)]
-1 (x=s, u), µ(ω ; A, b) = 
[∫Ab(z)θ s(z)dz][∫Ab(z)θ u(z)dz]
-1 = (ws/wu)[∫Als(z)dz] [∫Alu(z)dz]
-1. When the factor markets clear, ∫Als(z)dz = 
Ls, ∫Alu(z)dz = Lu. Since s ≡  Ls/Lu, ωµ (ω ; A, b) = s. à 
A1.2 The derivation of (4) with multiple factors 
Suppose there are a finite number of factors indexed by i = 1, 2…J. The factor endowments are E1, 
E2…EJ, and let si ≡  Ei/E1 ∀  i. Denote the unit factor requirements of the J factors in sector z by ai(z), and let 
si(z) ≡  ai(z)/a1(z) ∀ i (for factor 1, s1(z) = 1). The factor prices are wi, i = 1, 2…J, and let ω i ≡  w1/wi, ∀ i>1. 
Define the income share of factor i in sector z as θ i(z) ≡  wi ai(z)/P(z). Then Σ i=1
J θ i(z) = 1 ∀  z, wi = P(z) 
∂ Q
s(z)/∂ li ∀ i, z and Li
d(z) = [y/wi]b(z)θ i(z)∀ i, z. Call factor 1 “unskilled labor” and factor 2 “skilled labor”, 
and a similar manipulation as that in Appendix 1.1 yields 1/ω 2 = µ(.)/s2 , which is similar to (4) with ω 2 and 
s2 replacing ω  and s. This exercise can be done for any pair of factors. 
A1.3 The derivation of (6) 
To balance international payments,  ( wsLs + wu Lu)  = ( w ∫







*)  ; i.e. 
Home imports equal its exports. Thus  / = [w
∫
H P dz z b ) (
∫
F P dz z b ) ( ∫
H P b( s
*(ω
* + s
*)] / [ws(ω  + s)]. Plugging the 
definition of b(z) and (1) into this condition yields (6). 
 
Appendix 2: Properties 1 and 2 
 
A2.1 Property 1 
Lemma 1. ∂ lnAs(z)/∂ lnω  = ω /(ω +s(z)) = θ u(z). 
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Proof: By definition, MC(z) = ws As(z), and so ∂ MC(z)/∂ wu = ∂ As(z)/∂ω . Since MC(z) is the cost function 
of sector z when the output is 1 physical unit, ∂ MC(z)/∂ wu = au(z).   ∴∂ As(z)/∂ω  = au(z), and ∂ lnAs(z)/∂ lnω  
= au(z)ω /As(z)=ω /(ω +s(z)) = θ u(z).     à 
Property 1. ωµ (.) strictly increases in ω .  
Proof: Let A be a set of goods. Then:  
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dz z a z P z c
) ( ) ( ) (




At equilibrium, as(z), au(z) and P(z) all depend on ω  only, and so µ(.) and ωµ (.) both depend on ω  only. Let 
Ds ≡  ∫Ac(z)as(z)P(z)
-σ dz and Du ≡  ∫Ac(z)au(z)P(z)
-σ dz. Then ln[ωµ (.)] = lnDs – lnDu and: 







∂ ) (z as P(z)
-σ dz – ∫A c(z)
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-σ dz – ∫A c(z)
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The first square-bracketed term is non-negative since ∂ as(z)/∂ω  ≥  0 and ∂ au(z)/∂ω  ≤  0. The second square-
bracketed term is negative, as explained below. Thus ∂ ln[ωµ (.)]/∂ω  > 0.  
Define xk(z)≡  c(z)ak(z)P(z)
-σ  (k = s, u), and B ≡  {∫A[∂ lnP(z)/∂ω ]xs(z)dz}{∫A[∂ lnP(z)/∂ω ]xu(z)dz}
-1. Then 
xs(z)>0, xu(z)>0 ∀  z, and xs(z)/xu(z) = s(z). Furthermore, Ds/Du = (∫A xs(z)dz)/(∫A xu(z)dz)
-1. 
The sign of the second square-bracketed term depends on the sign of [B – Ds/Du] and ∂ lnP(z)/∂ω .. Let 
ws = 1. Then As(z) = P(z) and by Lemma 1, ∂ lnP(z)/∂ω  > 0 and decreases with z. Thus compared with 
Ds/Du, B has more weight put on low-indexed goods whose skilled-labor intensities are low so that B < 
Ds/Du  (a rigorous proof is available from the author upon request). Therefore the second bracketed term is 
negative.       à 
A2.2 Property 2: h(zl; ω ,ω
*) ≥  h(zh; ω ,ω
*) if zl ≤   zh ∀  ω , ω
* s.t. ω  >ω
*.  
Proof: Plug (1) and (6) into the definition of h(.):  
 h(z; ω ,ω
*) =  lnAs(z) – ln(ω +s)/σ  + ln(ω
*+s
*)/σ  - lnAs
*(z) - lnΛ (PH,PF, b; ω , ω
*)/σ    
Thus h(zl; ω ,ω
*) –  h(zh; ω ,ω
*) = [lnAs(ω , zl) – lnAs(ω , zh)] –  [lnAs(ω
*, zl) – lnAs(ω
*, zh)]. By Lemma 1, 
∂ [lnAs(ω , zl) – lnAs(ω , zh)]/∂ lnω   = [θ u(zl) - θ u(zh)] ≥  0 ∀ω  as zl ≤  zh. Since ω  > ω
*, h(zl; ω ,ω
*) –  h(zh; ω ,ω
*) 
= (ω  – ω
*){∂ [lnAs(ω j, zl) – lnAs(ω j, zh)]/∂ω  } ≥  0 by the mean value thoerem, where ω j ∈  [ω
*,ω ]. à 
 
Appendix 3: Propositions 1~4 
 
This appendix proves that when ψ H ≥  0, ψ F ≤  0, Γ  ≥  0, and at least one inequality is strict, ω  strictly 
falls. The proofs of the other cases in Propositions 1~4 are similar.  
A3.1. Preparation 
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Define: 
f(z; PH,PF, b; ω ,ω
*) ≡   lnAs(z) – ln(ω +s)/σ  + ln(ω
*+s
*)/σ  - lnAs
*(z) - lnΛ (PH,PF, b; ω , ω
*)/σ    
The difference between f(.) and h(.) is that h(.) is the value of f(.) at the equilibrium factor prices and 
production sets, and that f(.) could take any factor prices and production sets as its arguments.  
Lemma 2. ∂ f(z; PH,PF, b; ω ,ω
*)/∂ω  = (ω +s(z))
-1 – [σ (ω +s)]
-1 – [(σ  – 1)/σ ] [ω  +ωµ (ω ;PH, b)]
-1 
               ∂ f(z; PH,PF, b; ω ,ω
*)/∂ω
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H P c s









∂ ) ( s A


















dz z a z P z c
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H P s
H
dz z s z A z c
D
1 1 )] ( [ ) ( ) ( ω σ and so ∂ lnΛ (.)/∂ω  = (σ  – 1)[ω +ωµ (ω ; 
PH, b)]
-1. Thus ∂ f(z;PH,PF, b;ω ,ω
*)/∂ω  = ∂ lnAs(z)/∂ω  – [∂ ln(ω +s)/∂ω ]/σ   –[∂ lnΛ (.)/∂ω ]/σ  = (ω +s(z))
-1 – 
[σ (ω +s)]
-1 –[(σ  -1)/σ ][ω  +ωµ (ω ;PH, b)]
-1. The proof for ∂ f(z; PH,PF, b; ω ,ω
*)/∂ω
* is analogous.    à 
A3.2 The Proof 
Let  g n ≡   g (PH,n),  g 0≡   g (PH,0),  g 1≡   g (PH,1),  g n ≡   g (PF,n),  g 0 ≡   g (PF,0) and  g 1 ≡   g (PF,1). 
(See Section 3 for the exact meanings of the subscripts  “0”, “1” and “n”.) 
(i). Suppose ω  rises; i.e. ω n ≥  ω 0. Then  g n ≤ g 1 
Suppose  g n > g 1.             ( A 3 . 1 )  
Then:  ω nµ(ω n; PH,n, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,0, b)  
= [ω nµ(ω n; PH,n, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,n,   b ’ ) ]      (   ≥  0 by Property 1) 
+ [ω 0µ(ω 0;PH,n, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,1,  b’)]     (>  0  by (A3.1)) 
+ [ω 0µ(ω 0;PH,1, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,0,,   b ) ]      ( ≥ 0 since ψ H ≥  0) 
∴  ω nµ(ω n; PH,n, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,0, b) > 0.  
This contradicts (4), which implies that ω nµ(ω n; PH,n, b’) - ω 0µ(ω 0; PH,0, b) = s – s = 0.   ∴   g n ≤ g 1 
(ii). Since PH,1 ∪  PF,1 = PH,n ∪  PF,n = P1,   g n ≤ g 1 ⇒  g n ≤ g 1 and   g n ≤   g 1     (A3.2) 
(iii).  g n ≤   g 1  implies that ω n
* ≥  ω 0
* 
Suppose ω n




*; PF,n, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,0, b)  
= [ω n
*µ(ω n
*; PF,n, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,n,  b’)]     (<  0  by Property 1) 
+ [ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*;PF,n, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,1,   b ’ ) ]      ( ≤  0 by (A3.2)) 
+ [ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*;PF,1, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,0,   b ) ]      ( ≤  0 since ψ F ≤  0) 
  ∴  ω n
*µ(ω n
*; PF,n, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,0, b) < 0.  
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This contradicts (5), which implies that ω n
*µ(ω n
*; PF,n, b’) - ω 0
*µ(ω 0
*; PF,0, b) = s
* - s
* = 0. ∴ω n
* ≥  ω 0
*.  
(iv). Λ n(b’) ≤  Λ 0(b)  where Λ n(b’) ≡  Λ (PH,n, PF,n, b’; ω 0, ω 0
*); Λ 0(b) ≡  Λ (PH,0, PF,0, b; ω 0, ω 0
*). 
Denote ∫Ab(z)dz by M(A; b) where A is any set of goods (ω 0 and ω 0
* are not shown in the brackets because 
they are the same for Λ n(b’) and Λ 0(b) ). Then  Γ  = M(PH,1; b’)/ M(PF,1; b’) - M(PH,0; b) /M(PF,0; b).  
∴Λ 0(b) = [M(PF,0; b)/M(PH,0; b)](ws,0/ws,0
*)
1-σ  
≥  [M(PF,1; b’)/ M(PH,1; b’)](ws,0/ws,0
*)
1-σ      (since Γ≥ 0) 
≥ [M(PF, n; b’)/M(PH, n; b’)](ws,0/ws,0
*)
1-σ  = Λ n(b’)           (by (i) and (ii)) 
 
(v). Suppose  g 1 ≤   g 0. Then by (A3.2),  g n ≤   g 0       ( A 3 . 2 ’ )  
(v1). By (iv), f( g 0;PH,n,PF,n,b’;ω 0,ω 0
*) - f( g 0;PH,0,PF,0,b;ω 0,ω 0
*)= -(lnΛ n(b’) - lnΛ 0(b))/σ  ≥  0      (A3.3) 
(v2). f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) ≥  f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) by Property 2 and (A3.2’); f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, 
b’; ω 0,ω n
*) - f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω 0
*) = (ω n
*-ω 0
*)[∂ f(.; ω j
*, g 0)/∂ω
*] by the mean value theorem (MVT) 
with  ω j
*∈  [ ω 0
*,ω n
*]. Now ∂ f(.;  ω j
*, g 0)/∂ω
*  ≡   ∂ f( g 0;  PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω j
*)/∂ω
*  =  (1/σ )[s(ω j
*; g 0)–
s
*]/D1+[(σ -1)/σ ][s(ω j
*; g 0)–ω j
*µ(ω j








*; g 0))[ω j
*+ω j
*µ(ω j
*; PF,n,  b’)] > 0 by Lemma 2. Since s(ω j
*;  g 0) ≥  s(ω 0




PF,n,  b’) ≥ ω j
*µ(ω j
*; PF,n,  b’), ∂ f(.; ω j
*, g 0)/∂ω
* ≥  0. Since ω n
*≥  ω 0
* by (iii), f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) - 
f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω 0
*)≥  0.  
∴ f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) - f( g 0; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω 0
*) ≥   0     (A3.4) 
(v3). f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω n,ω n
*) - f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) = (ω n - ω 0)[∂  f(.; ω j, g n)/∂ω ] by MVT with 
ω j ∈  [ω 0, ω n]. Now ∂ f(.; ω j, g n)/∂ω  ≡  ∂ f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω j,ω n
*)/∂ω  = (1/σ ) [ s– s(ω j;  g n)]/D1 +[(σ -
1)/σ ] [ ω jµ(ω j;  PH,n,b’) – s(ω j; g n)]/D2 with D1  ≡  ( ω j+s)(ω j+s(ω j; g n)) > 0 and D 2  ≡   ( ω j+s(ω j; 
g n))[ω j+ω jµ(ω j; PH,n,b’)] > 0  by Lemma 2. Since s(ω j;  g n) ≤  s(ω n;  g n) ≤  s and ω jµ(ω j; PH,n, b’) – 
s(ω j; g n) ≥  0 ( g n is the least skilled-labor intensive good in PH,n), ∂ f(.; ω j, g n)/∂ω  ≥  0. Since ω n ≥  ω 0 by 
(i),   
∴ f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω n,ω n
*) - f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω 0,ω n
*) ≥   0     (A3.5) 
(v4). By A(3.3) ~ (A3.5) (at least one inequality is strict), h( g n; ω n, ω n
*) = f( g n; PH,n,PF,n, b’; ω n,ω n
*) > 
f( g 0; PH,0,PF,0, b; ω 0,ω 0
*) = h( g 0; ω 0, ω 0
*) ≥  0 (the last inequality is because  g 0 ∈  PF,0). This contradicts 
Equation (3), which implies that h( g n; ω n, ω n
*) ≤  0  since  g n ∈ PH,n. 
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(v5). Now suppose  g 1 >  g 0. Replace  g 0 in (v1) ~ (v4) with  g 1, and the proof goes through. In 
particular, in (v2), s(ω j
*;  g 1) ≥  s(ω 0
*;  g 1) ≥  s(ω 0
*;  g 0) ≥  s
* so that (A3.4) holds; in (v4), h( g 1; ω 0,ω 0
*) ≥  




A4.1 Sector-specific productivity parameter 
Let these parameters be A(z); without loss of generality, let A(z) ≥  1∀ z. Let the subscript “0” denote the 
case when A(z) = 1 ∀ z. Let B be a set of goods, P0 ≡ ∫B c(z)P0(z)
1-σ dz and P1 ≡  ∫B c(z)P(z)
1-σ dz. Then an 
increase in A(z) decreases MC(z) by the same proportion, and since price equals marginal cost, P(z) = 
P0(z)A(z)
-1. Thus P1 = ∫Bc(z)P0(z)
1-σ A(z)
σ -1dz, and b(z) = c(z)P(z)
1-σ /P1 = (P0/P1)A(z)
σ -1[c(z)P0(z)
1-σ /P0] = 
(P0/P1)A(z)
σ -1b0(z). On the other hand, the changes in A(z) do not affect θ s(z),θ u(z), s(z) and h(z). Thus:  
µ(.)= [∫Bb(z)θ s(z)dz] [∫Bb(z)θ u(z)dz]
-1 = [∫Bb0(z)A(z)
σ -1θ s(z)dz] [∫Bb0(z)A(z)




1-σ [ (z)dz][ (z)dz] ∫





F P b 0(z)A(z)
σ -1dz][∫
H P b 0(z)A(z)
σ -1dz]
-1  
A4.2 Country-specific productivity parameter 
Denote the country-specific productivity parameters by AH and AF. Without loss of generality, let AF = 
1 and AH ≥  1. Then µ(ω ; PH,b) and µ(ω
*;PF,b) are unaffected, and Equations (6) and (3) become:   
  AH





*)/(ω +s)]       (A4.1) 
MC
*( g (PF)) ≤   MC( g (PF))/AH; MC
*( g (PH))) ≥   MC( g (PH))/AH     (A4.2) 
Let ws’ ≡  ws/AH and wu’ = wu/AH; then ω  and ω
* are unchanged, and (A4.1) and (A4.2) become: 





*)/(ω +s)]       (A4.3) 
MC
*( g (PF)) ≤   ws’As( g (PF)); MC
*( g (PH))) ≥   ws’As( g (PH))     (A4.4) 
Compare (A4.3) with (6) and (A4.4) with (3), AH augments the left-hand side of (6) and ws’ replaces ws. 
Thus an increase in AH has the same effects on ω , ω
*, PH and PF as a shock that is Foreign-friendly and 




n have the same signs as ψ H, ψ F and Γ  under (7.1) and (7.2) 
It is sufficient to show that ψ H
n > 0  ⇔  ψ H > 0. The proofs for the other cases are similar. 
Proof: Notice that µ(ω 0; OH,1, b’) =   (z)θ ∫
1 , '
H O b s(z)dz /   (z)θ ∫
1 , '
H O b u(z)dz  
=   (z)θ ∫
0 , '
H O b s(z)dz /   (z)θ ∫
0 , '
H O b u(z)dz    ( b’(z) = 0 ∀ z ∈  OH,0 but ∉  OH,1) 
= (∫
0 , H O ρ b(z)θ s(z)dz + ∫
0 , H O ε (z)θ s(z)dz) (∫
0 , H O ρ b(z)θ u(z)dz + ∫
0 , H O ε (z)θ u(z)dz)
-1 
=   (z)θ ∫
0 , H O b s(z)dz /   (z)θ ∫
0 , H O b u(z)dz     (by (7.1))  
=  µ(ω 0; OH,0, b) 
Thus ψ H
n>0 ⇔  µ(ω 0; NH, b’) > µ(ω 0; OH,0, b) ⇔  µ(ω 0; NH ∪  OH,1, b’) > µ(ω 0; OH,0, b) ⇔  ψ H > 0. à 
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Appendix 5: Simple Case 
 
It is straightforward to show that in the simple case considered in Section 5,  (2) ~ (6) become: 
h(g) = 0; h(g) ≡  ln[MC(g)/MC
*(g)] = ln(ws/ws
*) + ln[As(g)/As
*(g)]   (A5.1) 
1/ω  =µ(ω ,g)/s; µ(ω ,g)≡  ∫g
1θ s(z)dz/∫g















*)] / [ws(ω  + s)]       (A5.4) 
Since the hole [zn, zn+dzn] has infinitesimal length, the equilibrium is well approximated by (A5.1) ~ 
(A5.4). Substitute (A5.4) into (A5.1) and differentiate (A5.1) and the logs (A5.2) and (A5.3): 
a11(+)          a12(-)      a13(-)   dg   bΓ  (+) 
a21(+) a22(+) 0    dω  =  -bψ    (A5.5) 
a31(+)     0  a33(+)      dω
*      0 
bΓ  = dzn/(1-g), bψ  = [θ s(zn)/∫g
1θ s(z)dz - θ u(zn)/∫g
1θ u(z)dz]dzn 




*),   
a21 = θ u(g)/ ∫g
1θ u(z)dz- θ s(g)/∫g
1θ s(z)dz,a22 = ∂ [ln(ωµ (.))]/∂ω ,   
a31 = -θ u(g)/ ∫0
gθ u(z)dz+ θ s(g)/∫0




1. a11 measures (1). the effect of a small change in g on the demand for Foreign goods relative to Home 
goods (Λ (.)) (the first term); as g goes up, Λ (.) goes up. (2). The effect of a small change in g on the relative 
marginal cost (the second term); as g goes up, h(g) goes down (by Property 2). 2. -a12 measures the effect 




* goes up, MC
*(.) goes down. 4. a21 measures the effect of a small change in g on µ(.), 
the average skilled-labor intensity in Home; as g goes up, µ(.) increases. 5. a22 is negatively related to the 
slope of the relative demand curve for skilled labor in Home; a22 > 0 by Property 1. 6. a31 is analogous to 
a21, and a33 analogous to a22. 
By Cramer’s Rule, dω  = [(-a11a33 + a13 a31) bψ – a21a33bΓ ]/D and dg = (a12a33 bψ + a22a33bΓ  )/ D; D ≡  
a11a22a33 – a13a31a22 – a12a21a33 > 0. Let c1 = – a21a33/(a13a31 – a11a33), we have (9.1), and (9.2) is 
straightforward to show.  
When there is a Foreign new good zn
* filling up the hole [zn
*, zn
*+dzn
*], (A5.5) becomes:  
a11(+)            a12(-)     a13(-)   dg   bΓ  
a21(+) a22(+) 0    dω  =  -bψ     
a31(+)     0  a33(+)      dω
*   -bψ
* 
bΓ  = dzn/(1-g) – dzn
*/g; bψ
* = [θ s(zn
*)/∫0




The other coefficients are the same as in (A5.5). Applying Cramer’s rule: dω  = [(-a11a33 + a13a31)bψ – 
a13a21bψ
* – a21a33bΓ ]/D, dω
* = [- a12a31bψ  + (- a11a22 + a21a12)bψ
*- a22a31bΓ ] /D and dg = (a12a33bψ  + 
a13a22bψ
* + a22a33bΓ  )/ D; D = a11a22a33 – a13a31a22 – a12a21a33 > 0.     
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Appendix 6: Concrete Examples 
 
A6.1. Preparation 
When P = [0, 1-dz), NH = [1-dz, 1] and NF = ∅ , denote the common good by gc rather than g. By 
Appendix 3 of Dornbusch, Fischer and Samuelson (1980): 
  /  = [(ω +s)/(ω ∫
1 ) (
c g dz z b ∫
c g dz z b 0 ) (
*+s
*)][As
*(gc)/As(g)]     (A6.1) 
  (z)(s-s(z))[ω +s(z)] ∫
1
c g b
-1dz = 0        ( A 6 . 2 )  
  (z)(s ∫





-1dz = 0        ( A 6 . 3 )  
Differentiating the equilibrium conditions yields:  
a11(+) a12(-) a13(-)   dgc   b 11(+) 
a21(+) a22(+) 0    dω  =  b21(-) 
a31(+)     0  a33(+)      dω
*      0 
 a11 = b(gc)/ + b(g ∫
c g dz z b 0 ) ( c)/  – ∂ h(g)/∂ g, a ∫
1 ) (









*), b11 = b(1)/ , a ) ( dz z
∫
c g b 0 ( [
21 = [b(gc)/(ω +s(gc)] (s – s(gc)), a22 = 
/(ω +s(z)) ∫
1 ) ( [
c g z b

















By Cramer’s Rule, dgc = a33 (b11a22– a12b21)/D with D = a11a22 a33- a13a31a22 – a12a21a33 > 0; thus 
sgn(dgc) = sgn(b11a22 – a12b21). Let µ S ≡   b(z)dz, µ ∫
1 ) (
c g s z θ U ≡   b(z)dz, and E ∫
1 ) (




c g z b
S + µ U = EH,  s = ωµ S/µ U  (by (4)) and s(z) = ωθ s(z)/θ u(z)  ∀ z.  Thus  b11 = b(1)/EH, a12 = [µ U - 
EHθ u(gc)]/[ω EH] and b21 = b(1)[θ u(1)EH - µ U]/µ U.  
A6.2 If η (z) ≥  1 ∀ z, dgc > 0. 
Proof: Let v(z) ≡  ∂ s(z)/∂ω  - θ s(z)/θ u(z); then v(z) ≥  0 if η (z) ≥  1 since η (z) = ∂ lns(z)/∂ lnω .. Thus: 
































2 )] ( [
) ( ) (
c g z s
z s z b
ω
(η (z) – 1)dz+∫
+
1
2 )] ( [
) ( ) (
c g dz
z s





















=A22 + µ Us/ω
2 (A22 ≡  ∫
+
1
2 )] ( [
) (
c g z s
z b
ω
[s(z)(η (z)-1) + v(z)s]dz > 0 since η (z) ≥  1) = A22+µ S/ω  
  ∴  b11a22 – a12b21 = [b(1)/EH]A22 + b(1)µ S[EHω ]
-1 [1-
U S
H c u U E g
µ µ
θ µ ) ) ( ( −
(EHθ u(1) - µ U)] 
Since µ S + µ U = EH and θ u(1) < 1,∴  0 < EHθ u(1) - µ U < µ S and 0 < µ U – EHθ u(gc) < µ U,  
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∴ [1-
U S
H c u U E g
µ µ
θ µ ) ) ( ( −
(EHθ u(1) - µ U)] > 0. ∴  b11a22 – a12b21  > 0 and dgc > 0.   à 
A6.3. If η (z) = 0 ∀ z, dgc < 0 if θ u(z) = β 1 for z ∈  [gc, x1), β 2 for z ∈  [x1, x2), and β 3 for z ∈  [x2, t], where 
β ’s depend on ω  and β 1 > β 2 > β 3.  
Proof: Since η (z) = 0 ∀ z, ∂ s(z)/∂ω  = 0, a22 = ∫
+
1
2 )] ( [
) (




















1 ) ( ) (
c g
U
u z z b
ωµ
θ







c g u θ Hθ u(z)-µ U]dz + [θ u(1)EH 
- µ U][EHθ u(gc) - µ U]}. By (A4.2),  [θ ∫
1 ) (














1 Hβ 3 - µ U) (EHβ 1 - µ U)]. 
Since EHβ 3 - µ U  = (β 3 - β 1) + (β dz z b
x
gc ∫














1 ) ( H(β 2 - β 1)  < 0 ∴ dgc < 0    à 
A6.4 The case of a continuum Ricardian model 
In this case, the equilibrium conditions collapse to: 




c g b s
*Ls
*)/(wsLs);  ws/ws
* =a(gc); a(z) ≡  as
*(z)/as(z) and increases in z 
Let ws
* = 1; totally differentiating these equations yields: c11dgc + dlnws = c12  and dlnws = c13dgc where c11 




c g b 12 = b(1)/  (z)dz> 0, and c ∫
1
c g b 13 = ∂ lna(gc)/∂ gc > 0. ∴ dgc = 
c12/(c11 + c13) > 0, ∴ dlnws > 0, and dMC(gc) = as(gc)∆ ws > 0.  
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Figure 3.1. Home-friendly shock (Γ >0) 
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Figure 3.3. Country-neutral shock (Γ =0) 
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Figure 3.4. The Integrated World Economy (IWE) 
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    Figure 3.5. Convergence (ω IWE ↓ ) 
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